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Abstract
A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is
examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilib-
rium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement of entanglement between
strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equi-
libria vanishes, and, (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more
closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le
1 Introduction
Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool to analyze various natural and social phenomena
[1, 2, 3]. After the publication of Meyer [4], there has been a great deal of effort to extend the
classical game theory into the quantum domain, and it has been shown that quantum games may
have significant advantages over their classical counterparts [4, 5, 6]. The classical game theory
includes a fatal drawback, namely, the multiplicity of equilibria. Battle of sexes, chicken game,
and stag hunt are famous examples of games with multiple equilibria. For a game possessing
multiple equilibria, the classical game theory can say nothing about the predictability of the
outcome of the game: there is no particular reason to single one out of these equilibria. Until
the present, several quantum extensions are considered to resolve this problem, e.g., battle of
sexes [7,8,9,10,11,12,13], chicken game [14,15,16,17], and stag hunt [16,17,18]. We also attack
this problem by analyzing a quantum extension of a game which describes market competition.
In economics, many important markets are neither perfectly competitive nor perfectly mo-
nopolistic, that is, the action of individual firms affect the market price [19]. These markets
are usually called oligopolistic and can be analyzed based on Game theory. Recently, Li et
al. [20] investigated the quantization of games with continuous strategic space, a classic instance
of which is the Cournot duopoly [21], in which firms compete on the amount of output they
will produce, which they decide on independently of each other and at the same time. Li et
al. [20] showed that the firms can escape the frustrating dilemma–like situation if the structure
involves a maximally entangled state. A key feature in Li et al. [20] is the linearity assumption,
that is, both the cost function and the inverse demand function are linear. It is well known
that linear Cournot games have exactly one equilibrium [19]. On the other hand, in nonlinear
settings, there may be multiple equilibria, and hence we may not predict the market price. A
natural question is whether the uniqueness of equilibria is guaranteed in the quantum Cournot
duopoly? We are trying to answer this question in this paper. To quantize the model, we apply
Li et al.’s [20] “minimal” quantization rules to Cournot duopoly in a nonlinear setting, where
there are one symmetric equilibrium and two asymmetric equilibria in the zero entanglement
1
case. 1 We observe the transition of the game from purely classical to fully quantum, as the
game’s entanglement increases from zero to maximum. We show that if the entanglement of the
game is sufficiently large, then all asymmetric equilibria vanish and there remains one symmetric
equilibrium. Furthermore, similar to Li et al. [20], in the maximally entangled game, the unique
symmetric equilibrium is exactly Pareto optimal. In other words, the multiplicity of equilibria
as well as the dilemma–like situation in the classical Cournot duopoly is completely resolved in
our quantum extension.
2 Classical Cournot Duopoly
We consider Cournot competition between two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. They simultaneously
decide the quantity q1 and q2, respectively, of a homogenous product they want to put on the
market. Let P (Q) be the inverse demand function, where Q = q1+ q2. Each firm j ∈ {1, 2} has
the common cost function c(qj). Then the firm j’s profit can be written as
uj(q1, q2) = P (Q)qj − C(qj). (1)
We assume that
P (Q) = a+ b−Q,
C(qj) =
1
4
(qj − a)4 − q2j + bqj − d,
where a, b, d > 0.
Given any q2, we have ∂
2u1(q1, q2)/∂q
2
1
≤ 0. Thus, to maximize her profit, firm 1 chooses q1
such that ∂u1/∂q1 = 0, that is,
−q2 − (q1 − a)3 + a = 0. (2)
Similarly, given any q1, firm 2 chooses q2 such that
−q1 − (q2 − a)3 + a = 0. (3)
A pair (q1, q2) is a Nash equilibrium iff it solves Eq. (2) and (3). Then, there are three equilibria,
(q1, q2) = (a, a), (a − 1, a+ 1), and (a+ 1, a− 1). At these equilibria the profits are
(u1(q1, q2), u2(q1, q2)) =


(d, d) if (q1, q2) = (a, a)
(3/4 − a+ d, 3/4 + a+ d) if (q1, q2) = (a− 1, a+ 1)
(3/4 + a+ d, 3/4 − a+ d) if (q1, q2) = (a+ 1, a− 1).
However, these equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal. The reason why they fail is that both
firms can be better off by jointly decreasing their outputs, since ∂ui/∂qi = 0 and ∂ui/∂qj =
−qi < 0 at equilibria. On the other hand, if the two firms can cooperate and restrict their
quantities to
q∗ ≡ q∗1 = q∗2 = a+ 2αβ−1 −
1
2
α2β,
where α ≡ (2/3)1/3 and β ≡
(
9a+
√
96 + 81a2
)1/3
, then they can maximize their joint profit
u1 + u2 (obviously (q
∗, q∗) is Pareto optimal). For example,
u1(q
∗, q∗) = u2(q
∗, q∗) = 7/4 + d,
1Several quantum extensions of oligopolistic competition, applying Li et al.’s [20] “minimal” quantization
rules, have been considered, e.g., the quantum Cournot duopoly game [22, 23], the quantum Bertrand duopoly
game [24,25], the quantum Stackelberg duopoly game [26,27], and the quantum oligopoly game [28].
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for a = 3. Thus, the joint profit at (q∗, q∗) is greater than that of any equilibrium.
With regard to the asymmetric equilibria, the situation is similar to that of chicken game if we
correspond the equilibria (a−1, a+1), (a+1, a−1) respectively to the equilibria (cooperate, defect ),
(defect , cooperate ) in chicken game. Below we will see that, as the measure of entanglement goes
to infinitely large in a quantum form of Cournot competition, the unique equilibrium comes to
be optimal, as if the unique cooperative equilibrium is attained in chicken game [15].
3 Quantum Cournot Duopoly
To model Cournot duopoly on a quantum domain, we follow Li et al.’s “minimal” exten-
sion, which utilizes two single–mode electromagnetic fields, of which the quadrature amplitudes
have a continuous set of eigenstates. The tensor product of two single–mode vacuum states
|vac〉
1
⊗|vac〉
2
is identified as the starting state of the Cournot game, and the state consequently
undergoes a unitary entanglement operation Jˆ(γ) ≡ exp{−γ(aˆ†
1
aˆ†
2
− aˆ1aˆ2)}, in which aˆ1 and aˆ2
(aˆ†
1
and aˆ†
2
) are the annihilation (creation) operators of the electromagnetic field modes. The op-
eration is assumed to be known to both firms and to be symmetric with respect to the interchange
of the two field modes. The resultant state is given by |ψi〉 ≡ Jˆ(γ) |vac〉1⊗|vac〉2. Then firm 1 and
firm 2 execute their strategic moves via the unitary operations Dˆ1(x1) ≡ exp{x1(aˆ†1 − aˆ1)/
√
2}
and Dˆ2(x2) ≡ exp{x2(aˆ†2 − aˆ2)/
√
2}, respectively, which correspond to the quantum version
of the strategies of the Cournot game. The final measurement is made, after these moves are
finished and a disentanglement operation Jˆ(γ)† is carried out. The final state prior to the mea-
surement, thus, is |ψf 〉 ≡ Jˆ(γ)†Dˆ1(x1)Dˆ2(x2)Jˆ(γ) |vac〉1 ⊗ |vac〉2. The measured observables
are Xˆ1 ≡ (aˆ†1 + aˆ1)/
√
2 and Xˆ2 ≡ (aˆ†2 + aˆ2)/
√
2, and the measurement is done by the homo-
dyne measurement with an infinitely squeezed reference light beam (i.e., the noise is reduced
to zero). When quantum entanglement is not present, namely γ = 0, this quantum structure
faithfully represent the classical game, and the final measurement provides the original classical
results: q1 ≡ 〈ψf |Xˆ1|ψf 〉 = x1 and q2 ≡ 〈ψf |Xˆ2|ψf 〉 = x2. Otherwise, namely when quantum
entanglement is present, the quantities the two firms will produce are determined by
q1 = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ,
q2 = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ.
Note that the classical model can be recovered by choosing γ to be zero, since the two firms can
directly decide their quantities. On the other hand, both q1 and q2 are determined by x1 and
x2 when γ 6= 0. It leads to the correlation between the firms.
Substituting qj into Eq. (1) provides the quantum profits u
Q
j for firm j:
uQj (x1, x2) = P (x1, x2)(xj cosh γ + xi sinh γ)− C(xj, xi).
where i 6= j and
P (x1, x2) = a+ b− eγ(x1 + x2),
C(xj, xi) =
1
4
(xj cosh γ + xi sinh γ − a)4
−(xj cosh γ + xi sinh γ)2 + b(xj cosh γ + xi sinh γ)− d.
Similar to the classical game, we also have ∂2uj(xj , xi)/∂x
2
j ≤ 0 for any xi. To maximize
her profit, thus, firm j chooses xj such that ∂uj/∂xj = 0, that is,
−xj sinh 2γ − xi cosh 2γ − (xj cosh γ + xi sinh γ − a)3 cosh γ + a cosh γ = 0. (4)
3
Solving Eq. (4) for both firms provides the quantum Nash equilibria, and the symmetric one is
uniquely given as
x∗(γ) ≡ x∗1 = x∗2 =
a
eγ
+ sechγ · αη−1 − 1
2
α2
η
eγ
, (5)
where η ≡
(
9a tanh γ +
√
12e3γsech3γ + 81a2 tanh2 γ
)1/3
. As easily seen from Eq. (5), the
quantity produced by each firm in the equilibrium, equals to eγx∗(γ), monotonically increases
and approaches to the Pareto optimal one q∗, as the entanglement γ increases. In fact, given
limγ→∞ tanh γ = 1 and limγ→∞ e
γsechγ = 2, we have limγ→∞ η = β, and thus,
lim
γ→∞
eγx∗(γ) = q∗.
As we have observed above, in addition to the symmetric one there are two asymmetric
equilibria in the classical model. Hence, it is expected that the quantum model also possesses
asymmetric equilibria at least as far as the entanglement is not too large. In fact, we can see
that this conjecture is valid for the case of a = 3 as follows. By substituting xj with qj, Eq. (4)
can be rewritten as
BRj : (a+ qj − qi − (qj − a)3) cosh γ − eγqj = 0. (6)
BRj is a locus of quantities, which is determined by firm j’s best response strategy xj to the op-
ponent’s strategy xi. Each intersection of BR1 and BR2 represents quantities produced in some
equilibrium. Fig. 1 depicts BR1 and BR2 for γ = 0, .285, and .6, respectively. Fig. 1 displays
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Figure 1: BR1 and BR2 for a = 3.
that the number of equilibria varies as γ changes. Fig. 1(i) corresponds to the classical model,
where there are three equilibria. Fig. 1(ii), in which five equilibria exist, shows the possibility
that the number of equilibria increases by the existence of the entanglement. In Fig. 1(iii),
asymmetric equilibria disappear and the only one symmetric equilibrium remains. Evidently
from these figures, there is the possibility of multiple equilibria even if the entanglement exists.
However, we can prove that asymmetric equilibria vanish when γ goes large.
Proposition For a sufficiently large γ, (x∗(γ), x∗(γ)) is the unique equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out that the quantifier “sufficiently large” in the proposition is not so
restrictive by the following reason. To obtain the proposition, we use the fact that sechγ/eγ → 0
as γ →∞. Since sechγ/eγ converges very quickly, the lower bound for γ, which guarantees the
uniqueness of equilibria, is not so large. For instance, any asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist
for γ > γ2 ≃ .296 when a = 3 (as we will see below in Fig. 2).
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Finally, we consider the transition of equilibria of the game from purely classical to fully
quantum, as γ increases from zero to infinity. Fig. 2 depicts the transition process for the case
of a = 3 and d = 10: the number of equilibria changes, as γ grows large, from 3 to 5, from 5
to 3, and from 3 to 1 at last. More precisely, there are two thresholds, namely γ1 ≃ .255 and
γ2 ≃ .296: for 0 ≤ γ < γ1, there are three equilibria; for γ1 ≤ γ < γ2, there are five; for γ = γ2,
there are three; and for γ2 < γ, the symmetric (and unique) one remains. The horizontal line at
11.75 (= 7/4 + d) represents the half of the maximum joint profit, and the line at 10 represents
the profit at the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the classical Cournot game. As easily seen from
the figure, asymmetric equilibria vanish and the unique symmetric equilibrium monotonically
approaches to the optimal one as γ goes large.
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Figure 2: The profits at quantum Nash equilibria as a function of the entanglement parameter
γ, where a = 3 and d = 10.
Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
Given a sufficiently large γ, let (q1, q2) be equilibrium outputs. Suppose to the contrary, q2−q1 =
δ 6= 0. Then, Eq. (6) implies:
(a− δ −A3) cosh γ − eγq1 = 0, (7)
(a+ δ − (A+ δ)3) cosh γ − eγ(q1 + δ) = 0, (8)
where A ≡ q1 − a. Subtracting Eq. (7) from Eq. (8), we have
(2δ −B) cosh γ − δeγ = 0,
where B ≡ 3A2δ + 3Aδ2 + δ3. It implies
B cosh γ = δ(2 cosh γ − eγ) = δe−γ .
Since we assume that δ 6= 0, B/δ = e−γ/ cosh γ, that is,
δ2 + 3Aδ + 3A2 − sechγ
eγ
= 0. (9)
It is necessary for Eq. (9) having a real solution that
4
3
sechγ
eγ
≥ A2,
5
which implies that A must be sufficiently close to zero since sechγ/eγ → 0 as γ → ∞. The
solution of Eq. (9) is given by
δ =
−3A±
√
−3A2 + 4 sechγeγ
2
≃ 0.
On the other hand, Eq. (7) implies that
δ = a−A3 − q1eγsechγ = a−A3 − (A+ a)eγsechγ.
Since eγsechγ → 2 and A→ 0 as γ →∞, we obtain
δ ≃ −a,
which implies that δ is bounded away from zero, a contradiction. Thus, for a sufficiently large γ,
any equilibrium must be symmetric. However, (x∗(γ), x∗(γ)) is the unique symmetric solution
of Eq. (4). ✷
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